Abstract-In the channel training phase, the attacker launches a pilot contamination attack by sending a synchronized and identical pilot signal with the legitimate transmitter. Such an attack can contaminate the channel estimation and alter the legitimate beamformer design. In this letter, first, we propose a pilot contamination attack detection scheme for wireless communications. By considering the prior uncertainty of the attack, we find that the decision-maker will conservatively decide the state of the attack, which is a subjective choice. In this case, we derive the subjective detection probability, the subjective false alarm probability, and the threshold. We analyze the tradeoff problem between ergodic wiretap channel rate and subjective detection probability. Next, based on the worst case that the attacker adopts the optimal power allocation to launch the optimal attack, we discuss the defense strategy of the optimal attack. Simulations show that the proposed scheme has a better performance than the benchmark method.
Pilot Contamination Attack Detection and Defense Strategy in Wireless Communications
Ning Gao , Zhijin Qin , and Xiaojun Jing
Abstract-In the channel training phase, the attacker launches a pilot contamination attack by sending a synchronized and identical pilot signal with the legitimate transmitter. Such an attack can contaminate the channel estimation and alter the legitimate beamformer design. In this letter, first, we propose a pilot contamination attack detection scheme for wireless communications. By considering the prior uncertainty of the attack, we find that the decision-maker will conservatively decide the state of the attack, which is a subjective choice. In this case, we derive the subjective detection probability, the subjective false alarm probability, and the threshold. We analyze the tradeoff problem between ergodic wiretap channel rate and subjective detection probability. Next, based on the worst case that the attacker adopts the optimal power allocation to launch the optimal attack, we discuss the defense strategy of the optimal attack. Simulations show that the proposed scheme has a better performance than the benchmark method.
Index Terms-Defense strategy, pilot contamination attack, wireless communications.
I. INTRODUCTION

B
EAMFORMING can be used to increase the signal power and enhance the communication security. Generally, beamformer is designed based on the channel state information (CSI), which is mainly estimated over the uplink channel [1] , [2] . However, a pilot contamination attacker can actively send the pilot signal to the receiver, which is identical to the one from the transmitter to the receiver [3] . The channel training phase will be contaminated and the beamformer design is then altered. In this case, the beamformer designed by the transmitter could cause serious power leakage and degrade the channel secrecy rate.
The concept of pilot contamination attack was first introduced in [3] , whereafter, there have been some work on this topic [4] - [8] . Yuan et al. [4] has proposed to add a random sequence to the pilot sequence, which makes it more difficult for the attackers to learn the pilot sequence. The code-frequency block group coding based pilot authentication has been proposed in [5] to separate the spoofer with high accuracy. Tugnait et al. [6] has superimposed a random sequence on the training sequence and proposed a source enumeration method to detect pilot contamination attack. As an extension of [6] , [7] has improved it via estimation of legitimate and illegitimate channels, which further remits the impacts of the pilot spoofing. However, these work requires the modification of the training sequence structure, which limits their compatibility with the existing wireless systems. In terms of the spoofing power optimization, Zhou et al. in [3] have investigated how an eavesdropper can improve its eavesdropping performance via pilot contamination attack and have analyzed an optimal power allocation for eavesdropper. An energy ratio detector (ERD) without modifying the training sequence has been proposed in [8] to detect such an attack, in which the tradeoff problem between eavesdropper's power and detection performance has been investigated but the closed-form expression is still missing. In this letter, we propose the receive power-to-noise ratio (RPNR) based pilot contamination attack detection scheme, which needs no prior information about the CSI and the noise, and requires no modification to the training sequence structure. With considering the prior uncertainty of the attack, the closed-form expression for the subjective detection probability, the subjective false alarm probability, and the threshold are derived. Moreover, the attacker's optimal power allocation is derived, and the defense strategy is discussed based on the optimal attack.
Notation: Boldface letter denotes matrix, such as A. A H is the Hermitian transpose of A and R A is the covariance matrix of A. I M is the identity matrix of dimension M × M . The abbreviation i.i.d. denotes "independent and identically distributed". E{·} denotes the expectation operator and C m×n denotes the complex space of matrix of dimension m × n.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the considered networks, the time-division duplex (TDD) is adopted and there are three components, including a legitimate transmitter Alice, an intended receiver Bob, and a pilot contamination attacker Eve. Alice is a base station equipped with M T transmit antennas, while Bob and Eve are resourcelimited devices with a single antenna, respectively. Denote x p (t) as the continuous time unit-energy pilot signal and x See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
pilot signal with N samples. The channel between transmitter and receiver is denoted as h tr , t, r ∈ {A, B, E}, t = r, which follows zero-mean complex Gaussian process of unit-variance, i.e., h tr ∼ CN (0, I M T ). In the reverse training, the pilot signal received at Alice is given by
where Y A ∈ C M T ×N , and the channel h BA , h EA ∈ C M T ×1 . Φ ∈ {0, 1} represents the absence and the presence of the attacker, respectively, and P B and P E are the power budget for Bob and Eve, respectively. N ∈ C M T ×N is the i.i.d. additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), in which each entry is with zeromean and variance σ 2 . Alice adopts maximum ratio transmission scheme to design the beamforming vector w as w =ĥ N I M T ) and · denotes the Euclidean norm. The LMMSE estimation ofĥ AE is given by [9] 
In the downlink transmission, the N sampled data signal
received at Bob and Eve are given by
respectively, where P A is the power budget for Alice, n ∈ C
1×N
is the AWGN, andh 1 e ∼ CN (0,σ
is the estimation error at Eve withσ
III. PILOT SPOOFING ATTACK DETECTION
The pilot contamination attack can cause a power leakage at the receiver. Since the CSI and the noise are unknown, it is hard to detect the attack roughly via the receive signal power, especially when the channel environment is worse. Therefore, we propose the following detection scheme.
In the downlink transmission, the data with N number of samples is received at Bob, and the sampled covariance matrix is calculated as R y B = E{y H B y B }. Then, the sampled covariance matrix R y B is written in a diagonal form
where E is the orthonormal matrix corresponding to the eigenvalue vector. Note that if the eigenvalues are arranged in the descending order, i.e.,
2 , the signal power is concentrated on the first k eigenvalues. Thereby, we utilize the maximum eigenvalue to minimum eigenvalue ratio to detect the attacker. The detection problem is formulated as the following hypothesis test:
where H 0 indicates the attacker is absent and H 1 indicates the attacker is present. If the test statistic is less than a threshold T , the decision-maker (Bob) accepts the hypothesis H 1 , otherwise, it accepts H 0 .
A. Subjective Detection Probability and False Alarm Probability
Note that λ max consists of the majority of the signal power in y B and λ min represents the variance of AWGN; however, they are hard to express via a closed-form expression. Therefore, we transform (7) into the following hypothesis test:
where the threshold γ can be denoted by threshold T , namely
. Since w is a unitary matrix, h N ) [10] . From the strong law of large numbers, for N sampled data signal, P ( lim
When making a decision with prior uncertainty, the conservative subjective choice reflects the real-life decision [11] . The subjective probability is to model the objective probability 1 P , which is given by
The function P s is the subjective probability, which is S-shaped and asymmetrical, and the subjective parameter μ s ∈ (0, 1] reveals how subjective choice distorts the probability P .
Theorem 1: With considering the prior uncertainty of the attack, the decision-maker in (7) is conservative, which can subjectively distort the objective probabilities.
Proof: Denote the prior probabilities of the attack presence and absence as P (1), P (0), where P (1) + P (0) = 1. Then, based on (8), the real-life subjective probabilities can be denoted as P
where p(·) is the probability density function, l(·) is the Likelihood ratio function and g = . The subjective probabilities suggest that the choice of decision-maker is conservative under the prior uncertainty, which can subjectively distort the objective probabilities.
Whereas, P (1), P (0) is unknown in practice, we use the subjective probability in (10) to model the real-life performance of the RPNR. The subjective false alarm probability is defined as
where P (·|·) is the conditional probability. Similarly, the subjective detection probability is defined as
where F Φ (·), Φ ∈ {0, 1} are the cumulative distribution functions of the sum of i.i.d. exponential distribution, which follows the Gamma distribution
The objective false alarm probability is given by
where
N . Similarly, the objective detection probability is given by
with
N . For a specified probability P s f , i.e., P s f = 0.1, the threshold is
B. Ergodic Wiretap Channel Rate
Even if there is a beamforming between Alice and Bob, Eve still can eavesdrop the channel with an ergodic wiretap channel rateR E which is derived bȳ
where (17) is the integral form of the ergodic wiretap channel rate,
is the generalized exponential integral [12] , and A =
Remark: If the number of samples is big enough at Bob, we can approximately calculate the main channel transmission/secrecy rate using RPNR without any prior channel knowledge, i.e., the channel CSI and the variance of AWGN.
IV. OPTIMAL SPOOFING POWER AND DEFENSE STRATEGY
When utilizing the RPNR scheme, there is a tradeoff problem for Eve. If Eve adopts higher power to launch the attack, it can greatly increase the ergodic wiretap channel rate. However, higher power increases the probability for Eve being detected. The tradeoff problem can be formulated as arg max
where P e is the power budget constraint at Eve. Substituting (12) , (17) into (18), we get
Substituting (3) into (14), and using the strong law of large numbers, we can rewrite (14) as
and letting
derivation is omitted for brevity), which indicates that f (P E ) is convex with respect to P E . To solve the optimal power allocation to maximize ergodic wiretap channel rate, we take the derivative of (19) and then we have
By setting (21) to be zero for simplifying, we get
The solution to (22) is given by P E =
(γ−1)σ 2 . Hence, the attacker's optimal power allocation is given by
Discussion: Considering the attacker can launch the optimal attack based on the optimal power allocation, we discuss the defense strategy of the optimal attack. From (23), Eve needs the parameters, σ 2 , P A , P B , γ, to obtain the optimal power allocation. Although σ 2 , P A , P B are usually known by Eve, the threshold γ is unknown, especially when Eve locates far away from Bob. Hence, we can keep γ privacy to prevent Eve from launching the optimal attack. However, Eve can utilize a "helper node", which is close to Bob to derive the threshold γ. Even so, we also can defend against the optimal attack through ensuring the confidentiality of the transmission powers. For example, Bob can change the transmission power P B in each reverse training phase via a predistribution rule only known by Alice, which can prevent Eve from launching the optimal attack. In this case, the ergodic wiretap channel rateR E will be decreased. Since there is no cochannel interference in TDD-based channel training, the defense strategy can be extended to the multiuser time division multiple access systems.
V. SIMULATIONS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In the simulations, there are multiple-antenna at Alice and single-antenna at Bob and Eve. The probability densities of the RPNR in the presence/absence of attacker are shown in Fig. 1 . via 10 000 times Monte-Carlo simulations. We verify that the probability densities are different, and the overlapping area represents the false alarm probability P f and the miss detection probability 1 − P d corresponding to F 0 (γ) and F 1 (γ). The approximate bound of the threshold is from 1.5 to 2.
By setting μ s = 1, 0.7, M T = 2, 4, and P A = P B = 2 W, for objective/subjective probability, the receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) are shown in Fig. 2 . Both the objective and the subjective ROCs show that the proposed RPNR has better detection performance than the ERD method [8] . It is because our proposed scheme can amplify the power gap caused by power leakage, especially in worse channel environment. Interestingly, with M T = 2, the detection performance is improved with the increase of P E , i.e., P E = 1 W versus P E = 0.45 W, but when the power allocation of Eve is optimal, the detection performance is the worst, i.e., P E = 1 W versus P E = 0.45 W versus P * E = 0.495 W. Moreover, the detection performance is improved with M T increases. to μ s = {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. It suggests that the optimal spoofing power P * E increases with μ s decreases. Note that a large range of potential spoofing power P E stays close to the optimal spoofing power P * E , i.e., the bigger the subjective parameter μ s is, the larger range it is. Thus, we conclude that the proposed subjective probability can increase the system's robustness and mitigate the power leakage. When P B changes from 2 to 1 W, the optimal spoofing power P * E changes from 0.420 to 0.2098 W. The results show that the optimal attack cannot be launched by the attacker without knowing P B and the ergodic wiretap channel rateR E will be decreased.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have redefined the subjective probability by considering the prior uncertainty of the attack. A detection scheme has been proposed based on the received power-to-noise ratio. We have analyzed the tradeoff problem between ergodic wiretap channel rate and subjective detection probability, and derived the attacker's optimal power allocation. Besides, we have discussed the defense strategy of the optimal attack. Simulations have validated the proposed scheme.
